ALPR Surveillance in San Francisco
San Francisco has a large fixed automated license plate reader network and SFPD personnel also have access to multiple ALPR platforms and databases. This page separates what the Department's own records say from our policy position about mass location surveillance.
Flock Safety rollout
SFPD Department Notice 24-052 states that a California Board of State and Community Corrections organized-retail-theft grant funded a partnership with Flock Safety to install a network of hundreds of ALPR cameras throughout San Francisco. Installation began March 19, 2024.
SFPD says Flock searches can use plate numbers and vehicle characteristics, including body type, make and color.
Current search and sharing rules
SFPD Department Notice 26-011 says members have access to multiple ALPR platforms and databases. Personnel must complete required training and must use the systems for law-enforcement purposes.
Queries must be associated with a CAD entry, incident report or documented reason for the search. SFPD says it conducts periodic audits.
The January 2026 directive also says SFPD's ALPR platforms are disabled from sharing information with federal or out-of-state agencies; members may not run queries at their request or provide them information obtained from ALPR databases.
It separately prohibits inquiries for immigration status or enforcement and inquiries for purposes associated with reproductive rights.
Retention: what SFPD's approved policy says
SFPD's Board-approved ALPR surveillance policy states that NCRIC advises ALPR data retention of 12 months from the date of capture.
The same policy contains important exceptions. A record connected to a criminal investigation or criminal-intelligence file may be retained for five years. ALPR data associated with a criminal investigation may also be downloaded, copied or printed and retained under applicable evidentiary rules through adjudication, appeals and statutes of limitation.
So 12 months is the ordinary retention period, not necessarily the maximum lifespan of every ALPR record.
Multiple ALPR systems
SFPD's 2024 ALPR Annual Surveillance Report says the Department expanded its ALPR program and added new vendors. It identifies:
- Flock ALPR
- Motorola/Vigilant ALPR
- Thomson Reuters CLEAR ALPR
At the time of that report, SFPD said it had approximately 300 ALPR cameras, not including mobile units, and expected total deployment to reach 400.
That is a dated 2024 deployment statement. DeFlock San Francisco is still working to establish the exact current active-camera count.
Policy is only part of the picture
Written restrictions matter, but so do technical configuration, network sharing, audit logs and actual access. DeFlock San Francisco will continue comparing the rules on paper with public records documenting how the systems are configured and used.
That is why our records work focuses not merely on the number of cameras, but also on retention, searches, sharing, audit controls, contracts and the databases available to users.
Our position
Police may investigate actual suspects. The harder question is why doing so should require collecting and retaining location information about everybody else who happens to drive past an ALPR camera.
Catch the bad guys. Don't track anybody else.
What does “deleted after X days” actually mean?
A stated retention period normally describes how long ALPR data is kept under the system's ordinary retention policy. It should not automatically be interpreted to mean that every copy of the data becomes permanently and irretrievably destroyed when that period expires.
When litigation is pending or reasonably anticipated, potentially relevant information may become subject to a litigation hold, suspending its ordinary disposition. Investigations, evidentiary requirements, subpoenas and other lawful preservation requirements may also result in particular information being retained beyond the normal retention period.
Electronic information may also exist in more than one place: production systems, backups, replicas, exports, investigative files, evidence repositories, or copies previously provided to another agency. Deleting a record from the primary ALPR system therefore does not, by itself, establish that every copy has ceased to exist or that no recoverable copy remains.
The public deserves specific answers:
- What exactly happens when the stated retention period expires?
- Is the information removed from a searchable database, or actually destroyed?
- Are backups, replicas and exported copies also deleted?
- What happens to information already shared with another agency?
- What circumstances suspend ordinary deletion?
- How long can information subject to a litigation hold, investigation or evidentiary requirement remain?
- Can information described as “deleted” remain technically recoverable?
- Who independently verifies that deletion actually occurred?
- What technical standard determines when the data is considered irrecoverable?
- Who bears the cost of auditing and verifying that process?
It is a rule governing ordinary disposition.
When you tell the public “30 days” or “one year,” what exactly happens on day 31 or day 366?
An important distinction: This does not mean that every deleted record must always be recovered or produced. Preservation and production obligations depend on the facts, applicable law, relevance, accessibility, proportionality, legal control, court orders and other circumstances. The narrower point is that expiration of an ordinary retention period does not, by itself, establish that the information no longer exists, cannot be recovered, or cannot be preserved longer when a legal obligation requires it.